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 Honeypot: single system to be
 Probed, attacked and compromised (hacked)
 By (unfriendly) attackers
 Honeynet: 
 A network of honeypots
 Copy of the “real world” network
 Not used in regular business
all (network) traffic caused by attackers
 Why honeynets and honeypots?
 Learn tactics, motives, tools and techniques of attackers
 Learn about (new) vulnerabilities
 Slow down an attack
 Honeynet within the German Research Network (DFN)
 Set up at the Leibniz Supercomputing Center (LRZ)










































































































































Honeynet must fulfill three requirements / tasks
1. Data capture
 Recording of all traffic
 Recording of all actions
 Inbound and outbound
2. Data control
 Prevention of attacks sourced in the honeynet
No harm to other (foreign) systems 
3. Data analysis
 Efficient analysis of captured data
 Extract relevant data out of “noise”
 Identifying techniques used in attacks















































































































































Data Capture Architecture: Honeywall
 Invisible for the attacker
Acts like a bridge 
(from attackers point of view)
 No TTL decrement
 No routing
 No spanning tree protocol
 Efficient capturing, analyzing, 
filtering and controlling tool 
(for the operator)
 All data passing can be 
captured (tcpdump)
 Extended firewall with IDS to 
detect known attacks
z Alarming










































































































































Data Capture Architecture: Honeypots
 Windows 2000 and SuSE Linux 
8.3
 Dump attackers keystrokes
 ComLog (Windows)
 Sebek (Linux)
z Forwards key strokes to log 
server
z Modified rootkit 
(hardly detectable)
z Able to capture secure 
shell (ssh) keystrokes
 Forwarding local logfiles to log 
server (modification prevention)
 Windows Eventlog to
syslog (log server)
 Linux: forward syslog to log 
server


















































































































































 Extended firewall with Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
 Firewall forwards outbound traffic to IDS (snort_inline)
 IDS drops known attacks (signature based)
 Even “automatic“ attacks like worms could not attack foreign hosts
 What about “unknown” attacks?
 Firewall restricts number of outgoing connections
 15 connections per day
 Asymmetry (could be suspicious for attacker)
 Alarming of the operator
 Monitoring firewall logs with swatch
 New entry, swatch sends an email
 SMS messages for outgoing connections










































































































































 Logfile analysis: finding the “valuable” packets
 Coping with a huge amount of data (up to 200 MB per day)
 snort logs with ACID
 Firewall logs with iptables_log
 Charting, summarizing, efficient query mechanisms
 Binary packet analysis: investigate the interesting packets
 Inbound and outbound traffic dumped with tcpdump
 Ethereal (Unix) and Packetyzer (Windows) 
 Decoding of several protocols; searching within the data
 Investigating source of attack: finding hostname, subnet or 
domain
 Reverse lookup for the hostname
 traceroute and visualroute finding “geographical” location










































































































































Results: General Observations and Traffic



























































































 At no time existence of the new subnet was propagated
 Honeynet got online 8:55 am (GMT+1) on July 15th









































































































































Results: Number of Sources
 Number of different IP-addresses per day
Remark: 
 Filter rules for NetBIOS normally activated at DFN access router













































































































































































































































































Results: Sources of Attacks
 DNS lookup promptly triggered on the firewall
 40 %  Digital subscriber line customers of „Deutsche Telekom“
 36 %  Unknown:










































































































































































Results: Kind of Attacks 
 Web Attacks
 Mostly against Microsoft IIS
 Plenty of well known vulnerabilities
 Worms
 Blaster appeared on August 11th 10:56 pm; variants on 20th
 Source: client within the Munich Research Network
 Snort_inline prevented further dissemination
 (Distributed) Denial of Service (DoS and DDos)
 DNS Servers of different US providers probably became victims
 Addresses of honeypots have been used spoofing the source









































































































































Results: Kind of Attacks (cont.)
 “Mysterium 55808”
 Packets with large window size 55808
 Destination port 57669
 No payload data
 Intrusec and ISS called causing trojan “Stumbler”
z Maybe for scanning purposes
 Noise
 Well known backdoor or trojan ports, e.g.:
z Skydance (Port 4000)
z RAdmin (Port 4899)
z ……










































































































































Results: Distribution of Attacks
 Attacked ports (services) and frequency
 47 % against Windows NetBIOS














































































































































































Results: Goals of Attacks
 69 % of all attacks hit Windows
 Web server attacks: comparison Windows / Linux 


































































































































































































































































Results: Attacks Regarding OS
 Well known attacks against Windows




























































































































































 “Unknown” systems are extremely fast under attack
 “Unfortunately” no “real” or “clever” hostile take over
 Windows was the favorite target (69% of all attacks; 95% 
of web server attacks)
 Most of the attackers are script-kiddies
 Data Control works: no harm to foreign systems, no 
distribution of worms
 90 / 10 Rule:
90% of the attacks can be prevented with 10% effort
 Implement a firewall 
 Block services which are a chinch to exploit
 Efficient patch management
 Use saved time to spend more time for the lacking 10%
